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Abstract
I discuss how modern cosmology illustrates under-determination of theoretical
hypotheses by data, in ways that are different from most philosophical discussions.
I confine the discussion to the history of the observable universe from about one
second after the Big Bang, as described by the mainstream cosmological model:
in effect, what cosmologists in the early 1970s dubbed the ‘standard model’, as
elaborated since then. Or rather, the discussion is confined to a (very!) few aspects
of that history.
I emphasise that despite the under-determination, a scientific realist can, and
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I propose to advertise the philosophy of cosmology (Section 2); and by way of example,
to sketch how modern cosmology illustrates kinds of under-determination of theoretical
hypotheses by data that are different from those treated in most philosophical discussions
(Section 3).
I can summarize the differences as follows. The usual philosophical discussion of under-
determination idealizes by assuming that all possible observations are ‘given’, though
of course they are spread through spacetime, i.e. never collected by a single scientific
community. Then the discussion addresses whether the theory of tiny unobservable objects
like electrons is under-determined; and relatedly, how good is our warrant for our accepted
physical theories. But cosmology takes due cognizance of the difficulties of observing the
distant universe and of collecting together observations; though of course it does not
address the general philosophical debate about our warrant for our accepted theories,
in particular our theories of tiny unobservable objects. This outlook is entrenched in
cosmology’s jargon—which I adopt. Thus cosmologists use observable universe to mean
(roughly speaking) ‘the past light-cone of Earth-now, and all physical events within it,
even microscopic ones’; as against, say, ‘all macroscopic or humanly observable events,
anywhere in spacetime’.1 Thus in cosmology, the issue of under-determination is not about
our warrant for the general theories we accept, such as general relativity and quantum
theory: but about whether the data about the observable universe determine a single
model of these theories as being correct.
I confine the discussion to the history of the observable universe from about one
second after the Big Bang, as described by the mainstream cosmological model: what
cosmologists in the early 1970s dubbed the ‘standard model’, as elaborated since then.
Or rather, the discussion is confined to a (very!) few aspects of that history.
I will also claim that under-determination in cosmology is entirely compatible with
scientific realism. This is worth emphasizing since much discussion, in philosophy as
well as in popular science, focuses on times earlier than about a second, and thereby on
energies so high that the physics, let alone the philosophy, becomes controversial. The
result is loose talk—and an unfairly bad press for scientific realism.
2 Cosmology as a spur to philosophy
As a branch of philosophy of physics, the philosophy of cosmology is less developed than
the philosophy of quantum physics, or relativity or thermal physics. But it is an alluring
field, for several reasons.
First, philosophy is about big questions: and our topic could hardly be larger! When
1Agreed, cosmologists also use ‘observable universe’ more restrictedly, reflecting their concern with
what can be ascertained by observation. Thus it often means instead: ‘the events in the past light-cone
of Earth-now, and to the future of the decoupling time’. For the meaning of this last phrase, cf. the end
of Section 2.2.
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we are told that we now know that a second after the Big Bang, the observable universe
had a temperature of about 1010 K and a density of about 2000 kilograms per cubic
centimetre, surely every philosopher feels a school-child’s thrill—quickly followed by wor-
rying how we could ever know such a proposition? I take this time, temperature and
density as my example because, as will become clearer below, we now know a lot about
the observable universe’s history from that epoch onwards.
Secondly, there have been countless connections between philosophy and cosmology:
not just over the centuries, with figures like Aristotle and Kant, but also since the rise of
scientific cosmology in the mid-twentieth century. That rise undoubtedly represents the
third golden age of cosmology; (the first two being the third and second centuries BCE,
with Epicurus, Aristarchus and Hipparchus, and the scientific revolution from Copernicus
to Newton).2
For philosophy of science, that rise is a spur to reflection, along many avenues. Here
are three well-explored ones. First: general relativity admits cosmological models in which
time has a beginning and-or space is finite: which obviously bears on old metaphysical
debates, dating from Kant’s antinomies and earlier, about whether such scenarios are
really possible. Second: general relativity admits closed timelike curves, i.e. curves which
are future-pointing at every spacetime point in the curve but which form a loop: which
suggests circles of causation. Both these cases concern the global as against local structure
of spacetime. But third: general relativity’s abandoning euclidean geometry as space’s
local structure had an even greater impact on philosophy, including general epistemology,
through such figures as Reichenbach, Kuhn, Grunbaum, Putnam and Earman.3
So much by way of describing the general landscape. I turn to introducing my chosen
topic, the under-determination of theoretical hypotheses by data.
2.1 Under-determination in cosmology
Under-determination in cosmology exhibits two main differences from the usual philo-
sophical discussion:
(i): a different construal of the idea of ‘all possible observations’; and
(ii): in cosmology, it is for the most part not theories, but rather their models, that
are under-determined.
The modality in (i) has of course various construals: we will see in Section 3 that cosmol-
ogy introduces some distinctive ones.
2Ellis (2007) is a recent masterly survey of the philosophical issues raised by modern cosmology; for
this paper’s topic, cf. his Sections 4, 5 pp. 1220-1234. Other fine surveys include several of his earlier
papers (e.g. 1975, 1991, 1999, 1999a) and Smeenk (2012). Longair (2006) is a recent masterly history of
twentieth-century cosmology; Kragh (1996) is a masterly, less technical history up to about 1970. Another
reason for advertising the philosophy of cosmology, given our paymasters’ now requiring ‘outreach’ and
‘impact’ from us, is that cosmology is one of the few sciences that engages the passionate interest of the
wider public.
3Masterly surveys of these three avenues include: Earman (1989, 1995), Torretti (1983), and Ryckman
(2005). Of course, there are several other such avenues: such as the changing nature of observation as
instruments develop, or the role of cosmology in explaining the direction of time.
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As to (ii), a theory usually comprises many possible solutions or models: i.e. histories—
temporal sequences of states—for the type of system it is concerned with. So even granted
a theory, there can be under-determination of which model or history is correct. This is
bound to threaten any historical science, such as cosmology or palaeontology, which aims
to describe a very complex, albeit single, history. And this threat arises even though
the science addresses only certain features of the history, such as the production and
preservation of fossils. Thus we will be concerned, not with choosing between rival gen-
eral cosmological theories, nor with the obvious fact that most of the detailed history of
the universe (as of the Earth) is bound to remain forever unknown; but with whether
the main features of that history addressed by cosmology—the primeval fireball, its ex-
pansion and cooling, the formation of stars and galaxies, the synthesis of elements—are
under-determined. As I mentioned, I will maintain, in the spirit of scientific realism, that
in fact we now know a lot about these features.
Mention of historical sciences raises an old chestnut: whether there can be a science
of cosmology given that there is only one universe. This preoccupied philosophers of cos-
mology in the mid-twentieth century, in connection with (i) speculations that cosmology
would involve distinctive laws that go beyond local physics, and (ii) debate about prin-
ciples that distinguished the Big Bang and steady-state cosmologies (cf. e.g. Balashov
(1994, pp. 935-944), Kragh (1996, pp. 220-233, 240-246)).
I think it is now widely agreed that there is no problem here. But for clarity, it is
worth spelling out why not. Even if laws need many instances, as Humeans like me say,
laws of cosmology do not need many universes. Rather, the laws of cosmology—in so far
as we know them—are the established laws of relativistic and quantum physics applied
in regimes relevant to understanding the universe as a whole. And this tends to mean:
(a) relativistic physics being applied on very large scales, at late times like now; and (b)
relativistic and quantum physics applied together on much smaller scales, at early times.
Here (b) means: quantum field theory on a curved spacetime background. And my ‘in
so far as we know them’ is a deferential nod in the direction of the terra incognita of a
quantum theory of gravity.
Of course (a) and (b) are linked: indeed, linked by one of the great over-arching narra-
tives of cosmology’s progress in recent decades. Namely: high-energy events in the early
universe provide us, through their present-day relics observable on cosmological scales,
with the ‘ultimate laboratory’ for testing quantum field theories at high energy (Longair
2006, p. 335, 407, 444). One main aspect of this is structure formation: the present-day
large-scale structures of the universe—especially, galaxies—are nowadays believed to have
originated from tiny early-universe inhomogeneities which are quantum in nature.4
Here we must beware of confusingly different jargons. Cosmologists often use ‘theory’
only for a very general theory such as general relativity or quantum theory, and use
4Agreed, the origin of these is unknown. Suffice it to say here that most popular models of the very
early universe (i.e. for times well before one second) postulate a quantum field, the inflaton, the quantum
fluctuations of which during an exponential expansion of spacetime at very early times (about 10−35
seconds to 10−33 seconds!) are later amplified and ‘frozen out’, so as to produce the observed large-scale
structures.
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‘model’ for its application to a specific system, even a ‘total’ system such as the universe.
Thus what philosophers would call ‘the Big Bang cosmological theory’ was called by
cosmologists ‘the standard model’, already in the early 1970s (Weinberg (1972, p. 469),
Misner et al. (1973, p. 763)): the honorific name reflecting its recent confirmation by
the discovery of the cosmic background radiation. The model has of course been much
elaborated since then, so as to incorporate such major new ideas as cold dark matter and
dark energy.
But even as thus elaborated, this model represents, not a single possible history of (the
main features of) the universe, but a family of possible histories, differing in various ways:
in particular in the values of several parameters, called ‘cosmological parameters’—which
it is the business of observational cosmology to try and determine. Thus cosmologists
tend to speak of observations deciding between versions of this model, which is taken
as being established; whereas philosophers would tend to speak of observations deciding
between models of a cosmological theory.
These differing jargons are confusing, since in a philosopher’s ear, the cosmologists’
jargon can suggest (contrary to one of my claims) that cosmology faces no threat of under-
determination of models. Thus they might say, ‘the standard model is established’. But
I have adopted the philosophers’ jargon, so that ‘model’ represents a single history (more
precisely: the main features of a single history). And in that sense, all hands must agree
there is a threat that models are under-determined, even by all possible observations.5
Finally, here is a general motivation for choosing under-determination as a topic: it
can be addressed using well-known philosophical notions, and well-established physics.
As regards philosophy: we will see in Section 3 that cosmology gives vivid cases of under-
determination of theoretical hypotheses by data. And the usual sorts of grounds, such
as simplicity and explanatory power, can be and have been adduced as breaking the
under-determination.
As regards physics: the pros and cons of the alternatives can be discussed in terms of
various versions of, and some respectable rivals to, the standard model. Of course, a brief
philosophical paper such as this can, and needs must, exclude all the details of physics.
My point is just that by not considering times much before one second, in particular not
considering inflation, we can stick to well-established physics.
This may make my topic seem tame—business as usual—both philosophically and
physically. But I think it is no less interesting on that account: (there is a surely too
much ‘gee-whiz’ in popular cosmology; so it is good to see that philosophy of cosmology
need not follow suit). In any case, this topic will lead on to other questions, which are not
only alluring, but as wild as you could wish for, both philosophically and physically. The
5A qualification, reflecting the fact that the theory-model contrast is of course vague. (Thanks to C.
Beisbart, W. Stoeger and H. Zinkernagel for emphasizing this to me.) I do not mean to suggest that the
standard model is established beyond doubt. There is respectable dissent: for example, there are rival
inhomogeneous models without dark energy (cf. e.g. Ellis (2007, Section 4.2.2, pp. 1223-1227; 2011,
Section 4, pp. 11-15), Nadathur et al (2011)). So a philosopher might well speak of a dispute over, or
under-determination of, theories; though the dispute may well be resolved by observations over the next
decade or two.
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philosophical questions concern the explanation of initial conditions, and-or the values of
physical constants: especially in relation to the ideas of selection effects (the anthropic
principle), and a multiverse. The physical questions concern the universe at times much
earlier than one second after the Big Bang: i.e. much earlier in logarithmic terms, such
as 10−35 seconds, when inflation is supposed to have started. Proposals for the physics at
those times are very speculative, since the energies, densities, pressures etc. far outstrip
what we have evidence for—and may forever do so.
2.2 Defending scientific realism
The prospect of under-determination means that as a scientific realist, I owe you a state-
ment of my position. Indeed: since I started with a description of the observable universe’s
temperature and density one second after the Big Bang, you are bound to ask whether
I really believe it, and similar such propositions about the universe from then on, which
cosmologists nowadays tell us in countless papers and books.
Credo: I answer, as a scientific realist: Yes I do, and claim that every scientific realist
should. Despite subsequent Sections’ focus on under-determination, a scientific realist
can, and should, believe the main claims of today’s standard model’s description of what
happened in the observable universe from about one second after the Big Bang onwards.
The under-determination to be discussed in Section 3 does not prevent those claims being
correct. And I believe that those claims are now, and will forever remain, as well estab-
lished as countless other scientific facts, e.g. that the sun’s surface temperature is about
5000 K, plants photosynthesize, and insulin has fifty-two amino acids.
Three clarifications of this credo are needed. All are straightforward. The first, in brief,
is that scientific realism implies belief only when the evidence is sufficiently plentiful and
varied. Of course, there can be no general statement of what would be ‘sufficient’. And
even for a specific topic which the scientific community regards as well understood, such
as synthesis of atomic nuclei starting at about one second after the Big Bang, there are,
often or always, details that remain recalcitrant (for this topic, the abundance of lithium
is an example); and so there is room for rational dissent. But if the evidence is thin, we
should of course all be more cautious.
So here I should admit two broad ways in which for cosmology, the evidence is indeed
thin—and so clarify my weasel words ‘main claims’ and ‘today’s standard model’.
(1): As I said in Section 2.1, most of the detailed history of the universe will of course
remain forever unknown. Besides, as I hinted there, major causal and structural factors
are not understood, such as the nature of dark matter and dark energy, and the process of
galaxy formation. Thus there are many versions of ‘today’s standard model’—and besides,
various respectable rivals. In assessing these versions and rivals, we still have a lot to learn.
But a great deal is now established. One main example is the overall thermal history of
the observable universe. We know that about 13 billion years ago, there was an extremely
hot and dense ‘fireball’ in which light nuclei (like hydrogen and helium) were synthesized,
according to well-understood nuclear physics; it cooled and expanded, with the details
being accurately described by quantum theory, thermodynamics and general relativity;
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later, gravitational clustering led to galaxies and stars, in which still more elements were
synthesized. All this is today as certain as the fact that insulin has fifty-two amino acids.6
(2): The evidence is also thin for times that are, in terms of physics, much before one
second. Here one needs to think logarithmically: times like 10−10 or even 10−3 seconds
count as much earlier than a second, since the temperatures, densities, energies etc. rise
in a similar exponential way. Nowadays, it is common to take the boundary between
known and speculative physics to be at about 10−11 seconds, before which the energies
are too high for us to be confident that the (namesake) standard model of particle physics
applies. But there is much we still do not understand about the energy regimes that are
described by that namesake standard model, compared with the energies at which nuclei
are synthesized, at about 1 second. Hence my cautiously taking the threshold of trust to
be about 1 second.
I turn to my second clarification. Not only should we now be agnostic about regimes
for which data are lacking and theory is speculative. It is also reasonable to expect that,
however fortunate we may later be in developing theories and making observations, we
shall never know all, or even much, about arbitrarily early times. And a fortiori, the same
goes for the Big Bang itself—whatever exactly it was.
Two more specific points, touched on above, support this scepticism that we will ever
understand cosmogony. (1): We might live in one part of a multiverse, with evidence from
other regions that would be crucial to such understanding remaining forever unavailable
to us. (2): Understanding a general theory does not secure understanding of one of its
solutions, or of a specific object described by the theory. So even if we had a quantum
theory of gravity (a ‘theory of everything’), still quantum cosmology would be a historical
science; and we might never know or even be able to formulate or understand the specific
details of the singular origin. This limitation could hold even if there is a rationalist
transparent intelligibility about the laws of the theory of everything, of the kind Einstein
hoped for.7
To sum up these two clarifications: such agnosticism is no problem for scientific real-
ism. We realists believe that nowadays our best theories are good enough that they are
mostly true. That is: they are supported by enough detailed and mutually independent
lines of evidence, that we believe them. But this realism does not imply that we can, now
or ever, know or have warranted belief, or even gather any evidence, about all parts, or
even every aspect of any single part, of the universe.
6Thus authoritative textbook descriptions of this thermal history, written over the last forty years,
largely agree with each other. Cf. for example: Sciama (1971: Chapters 8, 12-14), Weinberg (1972,
Chapter 15.6, pp. 528-545), Wald (1984, pp. 107-117), Barrow and Tipler (1988, pp. 367-408, Sections
6.1-6.7), Lawrie (1990, pp. 315-326), Longair (2006, 394-399), Weinberg (2008, pp. 101-113, 149-173;
Sections 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2). For fine popular accounts, cf. Silk (1989, Chapters 6 to 8), Rowan-Robinson
(1999, Chapter 5), Silk (2006: pp. 112-128). Besides, the thermal history of the universe is by no means
the only ‘main claim’—or rather: ‘grand narrative’ !—that is now firmly established. The theory of stellar
structure and evolution is another example, for which one could similarly cite authoritative descriptions
over several decades largely agreeing with each other.
7For philosophical discussion of the search for quantum gravity, cf. e.g. Ellis (1999, pp. 708-718;
1999a, pp. 62-65), Rovelli (1999, 2007), Butterfield and Isham (2001). For the Big Bang in relation to
the cosmological argument for theism, cf. Pitts (2008).
8
The third clarification is that my credo is not intended to deny conceptual change
or meaning variance: neither during the past process of establishing the present con-
sensus about the universe’s history after one second, nor during future research about
that history. As to the past process, the point is agreed by all. Section 2.1 mentioned
some examples that have long since become standard in philosophy: general relativity’s
allowance that time had a beginning, or that space is finite, or of closed timelike curves,
or of non-euclidean geometry. As to the future, it is of course impossible to cite examples.
No one can say whether today’s problem of primordial lithium abundance will turn out to
be an all-too-recalcitrant anomaly, harbouring some radical change, like the perihelion of
Mercury did a century ago. Nor can we be confident that any such anomaly will concern
only such amazingly early epochs as one second after the Big Bang or earlier. It might
concern a much later epoch: for example, 400,000 years later, when the cosmic microwave
background radiation decoupled from matter. The physics of that decoupling is intricate
(Weinberg 2008, pp. 116-125, Section 2.3): and crucial for cosmology, since nowadays
that radiation (predicted in 1950 and discovered in 1965) is our main ‘direct’ evidence for
the Big Bang. Besides, we cannot now directly observe (by any electromagnetic means)
events that occurred earlier than that epoch, since until that time the universe was opaque
to radiation. And in general, it is bound to be controversial, even among scientific realists,
and for a given science or theory, how much, and how radical, future conceptual change
to envisage; (cf. e.g. Sklar (2010)). So even for the standard cosmological model, I will
not venture a general statement about this.
So much by way of clarifications. Let me summarize by emphasizing that to trust
today’s main claims for times later than one second after the Big Bang, is not reckless or
maverick: witness Rees’ remark that he is 99% confident of this account (2003, pp. 24,
31; 1997, p. 65, 174).
3 Under-determination ‘in practice’, not ‘in princi-
ple’
Section 3.1 briefly discusses how cosmology prompts some special considerations about
under-determination. Then Section 3.2 gives some details by reporting recent results of
Manchak (2009, 2011).
3.1 Four contrasts
In Section 2.1, I announced that cosmology would involve two main contrasts from the
usual philosophical debate about whether all possible observations might fail to decide
which of some set of alternative theories is correct. I shall first re-state these two contrasts;
and then sketch two other mistier contrasts.
The tenor of all four contrasts (and of Section 3.2) will be that cosmology provides
examples of under-determination ‘in practice’, rather than examples ‘in principle’ of the
type philosophers usually focus on. But it will be obvious that the relevant senses of ‘in
9
practice’ are far removed from the genuine practicalities of observation, or more generally,
of assessing evidence. Thus I submit that the examples are of philosophical interest: they
are not ‘merely’ (as someone snooty about science might say) a scientific challenge as to
how to get more data to decide between alternatives.
(1): The first contrast is that in philosophical discussions of cosmology, ‘all possible ob-
servations’ is often construed as the observations that could be made by a single observer
who lives forever dutifully collecting observations of all events in their past light-cone.
This construal is made precise using the idea of a spacetime model (i.e. a possible course
of history throughout all space and time), and allied ideas like the past light-cone: details
in Section 3.2. (Of course, the analysis remains the same if instead of an immortal single
observer, one considers, a bit more realistically, an eternal dynasty of observers with each
generation bequeathing its observations to the next.) On the other hand, much philo-
sophical debate (for example, over van Fraassen’s advocacy of constructive empiricism,
or Putnam’s rebuttal of metaphysical realism) has construed ‘all possible observations’
with no regard to ‘bringing it all together’: i.e. as the set of all observations made by all
possible observers located throughout spacetime—a set which, in most spacetime models,
could never be collected together and collated.
(2): The second contrast is that in cosmology, we are faced with deciding between
different models: under-determination is a matter of all possible observations, in the
above ‘eternal-observer’ sense, not deciding between many different histories allowed by
our theory. On the other hand, philosophers have usually construed under-determination
as about theories: empirically equivalent, but theoretically radically different, theories.
(As I mentioned in footnote 5: I agree that this contrast is not hard and fast, since the
theory-model contrast is vague, and there is respectable dissent from what I dubbed ‘our
theory’, i.e. the standard model.)
These two contrasts clarify Section 2.2’s credo avowing that scientific realism is in no
way undermined by our perhaps being forever unable to choose between rival theories of
the earliest moments of the universe. In short: the boot is now on the other foot. That
is: precisely because those earliest moments are so infernally hard to get evidence about,
the usual philosophical construals of under-determination may apply. We may be forever
unable to choose between different theories (not ‘merely’ models) of those moments: even
when we envisage having access to ‘all possible observations’, even on some very liberal
construal that disregards the ‘mere practicalities’ of someone collecting and collating
the evidence; and even when we also envisage endorsing some powerful methodological
principles of theory-selection.
There are also two other, mistier, contrasts; which I mention but will not pursue in
detail.
(3): One arises from this last remark about Section 2.2’s credo. It is the contrast
between the predicaments of:
(a) being unable to choose between alternative theories we have formulated, and
(b) being unable to formulate a theory of the topic in question, and not because of
lack of evidence or ingenuity or funding or ... but because we have good reason to doubt
any of our concepts can apply to the topic.
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For the topic of the very early universe or the Big Bang, one obvious suggestion for how we
might face the second predicament, (b), is the Kantian thought that all our concepts and
theories presuppose in some way claims about space and time that these topics violate. A
second suggestion is the operationalist thought that scientific concepts must be potentially
measurable; and that since at temperatures like 1010 K, we—or any being—would be hard
pressed to measure anything, e.g. time, distance or temperature itself, our concepts break
down. A third suggestion is the relationist thought that, irrespective of measurement,
the concept of time and-or space needs to be appropriately anchored in matter: Rugh
and Zinkernagel (2009) develop this suggestion in detail; (cf. also Zinkernagel (2002, pp.
510-514), Rugh and Zinkernagel (2011, pp. 419-422).
(4): This leads to the fourth and last contrast. For some recent philosophical discussion
of under-determination of theory by data focusses on alternative theories that are not
(but could be) formulated at the time in question; and it explicitly sets aside under-
determination of models of a given theory of the sort which will concern me.
Thus Stanford, in the opening pages of his recent monograph (2006, p. 14), sets aside
the sort of under-determination we will see in Section 3.2. His idea is that since our
cosmological theory itself describes how we cannot have evidence to decide between the
alternatives in question, this sort of under-determination is of little philosophical interest.
The scientific realist could and should reply that they are realists only about theoretical
claims that are ‘amenable to empirical investigation’.8 His book goes on to argue against
realism that in the past, well-confirmed scientific theories often have had theoretically
radically different alternatives, which were not conceived at the time, but which would
have been at least as well confirmed by the available evidence (2006, p. 19).
I will not try to assess Stanford’s claims and the ensuing debate: except to commend
realists such as Chakravartty (2008, Sections 3, 4) who reply that Stanford’s challenge: (i)
is closer to the traditional ‘pessimistic meta-induction’ than he allows, and (ii) is answered
by some of our theories giving us detailed causal knowledge of objects and properties. (I
also commend Lipton’s lucid and pre-cognitive (1993) reply to Stanford.)
But I submit that, however this debate is resolved, the conclusions are likely to be
distinctly philosophical. In particular, being convinced by Stanford that one’s current
theory has an equally well-confirmed but unconceived alternative cannot much influence
one’s research. (Similarly, being convinced by Kant that one could not have a theory
of a non-spatiotemporal topic could influence one’s research on such a topic only by
prompting one to give it up altogether.) On the other hand, in the more ‘local’ setting
of deciding between models of a given theory, rather than entire theories—in our setting:
of deciding between general relativistic cosmological models—there is better hope for
one’s philosophy being in contact with the scientific practice; as well as better scientific
prospects for escaping the under-determination.
8Stanford also suggests the situation here is like the standard example of alternatives in Newtonian
gravitation theory (say, for point-particles) differing about the velocity of the universe’s material contents
with respect to absolute rest (2006, p.13); or even like the example of alternatives obtained by conjoining
arbitrary propositions to any given theory (2006, p.15). I think the three cases are importantly different,
but I will not pursue the point.
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3.2 Observationally indistinguishable spacetimes
I turn to illustrating under-determination of cosmological models in general relativity,
by reporting the theorems of Manchak (2009, 2011); (which build on ideas and results
of Glymour (1977) and Malament (1977)). Roughly, the theorems say that in almost
every spacetime obeying general relativity, no observer, however long they live, could
accumulate enough observations to exclude their being in another very different spacetime.
The theorems also give a glimpse of the kind of result nowadays obtained in the philosophy
of general relativity.
Some notation and jargon.
(1): In general relativity, a model is given by a spacetime (M, g) consisting of a four-
dimensional manifold M of spacetime points, equipped with a metric tensor g, which
generalizes special relativity’s metric including light-cone structure.
(2) A region of one model, U ⊂ M , is isometric to another region of another model,
U ′ ⊂M ′, if there is a suitable function d : U → U ′ that carries M ’s metric g as restricted
to U into M ′’s metric g′ as restricted to U ′. This means full knowledge of all the metrical
relations between points in U could not exclude one’s being instead in U ′.
(3): Of course, one usually knows much less than everything about metrical relations,
and more than nothing about spacetime’s matter and radiation content: which so far,
seems culpably unrepresented in our notion, (M, g), of a cosmological model. But the
theorems and discussion can probably be adapted to include facts about matter and
radiation; (Malament 1977, pp. 74-76).
(4): I turn to representing the past light-cone of (an observer at a) spacetime point
p ∈M . This is the region from which signals travelling at most as fast as light can reach
p. So it is the largest region that an idealized observer at p could observe (setting aside
pre-cognition!). But it turns out, for technical reasons, to be easier to work with the
interior of a point p’s past light-cone, i.e. the points connectible to p by signals travelling
slower than light. This is dubbed the chronological past and written I−(p).
Summing up this notation and jargon: Manchak’s theorems show that an ideal ob-
server at p ∈ M who knows the full metric structure of I−(p) cannot know much about
the global structure of her spacetime, since many different spacetimes, with widely vary-
ing global properties, have a region isometric to I−(p). More precisely: let us say that a
spacetime (M, g) is observationally indistinguishable from (M ′, g′) iff for all points p ∈M ,
there is a point p′ ∈ M ′ such that I−(p) and I−(p′) are isometric. (The fact that this
notion is asymmetric will not matter.) Then the gist of the theorems is that almost
every spacetime is observationally indistinguishable from another, i.e. a non-isometric
spacetime.
The theorems also veto an observer’s ascertaining some global properties of her space-
time. Manchak lists four such properties. Three are ‘good causal behaviour’ properties;
e.g. one is that the spacetime be globally hyperbolic, a notion which allows a strong form
of determinism. The fourth is spatial isotropy, i.e. there being, at every spacetime point,
no preferred spatial direction: an assumption which is made by the standard cosmological
model, and more generally, is central to modern cosmology (under the name ‘the cosmo-
logical principle’). Thus the theorems veto an observer’s ascertaining these properties:
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given a spacetime (M, g) with any or all of these properties, there is an observationally
indistinguishable spacetime with none of them.
One might worry about the scientific significance of the theorems. For the proofs build
the non-isometric spacetime (M ′, g′) using a mathematical ‘cut-and-paste’ construction,
which might therefore look ‘unphysical’. But that vague word covers several possible
misgivings. One is that the theorems entirely concern classical general relativity, which
we have every reason to believe fails for the extreme conditions in the very early universe
and black holes. But this points beyond standard cosmology—and so beyond this paper.
Within classical general relativity, the theorems are not so easily dismissed. That we
define a spacetime model by a cut-and-paste construction is no evidence at all that the fea-
tures it exhibits are not generic among general relativity’s models. And as to the specific
four global properties that Manchak shows to be impossible to ascertain observation-
ally: he reviews various authors’ rationales for requiring one or more of these properties,
concluding sceptically that none of these rationales are convincing (2011, Sections 5 and
6).
To conclude: I concur with Manchak’s sceptical conclusion. Besides, it meshes with
two other recent assessments, which I also commend. Norton (2011, especially Sections
5 and 6) connects Manchak’s theorems and others like them with his own advocacy of a
material theory of induction; and he concludes that we are at a loss to justify the inductive
inferences, which favour ‘reasonable’ spacetimes over apparently ‘gerry-mandered’ obser-
vationally indistinguishable alternatives, that we intuitively endorse. And Beisbart has
focussed on the fourth property in Manchak’s list: spatial isotropy which, as I mentioned,
lies at the centre of modern cosmology, especially its cosmological principle. Beisbart
(2009; Beisbart and Jung 2006) reviews the various justifications which, over the decades,
have been offered for the cosmological principle, especially as a principle for breaking
under-determination of models. He also is sceptical: the justifications are not compelling.
Can we do better? That is an invitation ... to work for another day.
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